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COASIAN EXTERNALITY THEORY
IN A POLICY CONTEXT
ALAN RANDALL*

Coasian externality theory must be discussed on at least two levels,
as an intellectural exercise and as a formula for policy. Coase
developed his ideas as he wrestled with policy issues. 1 In his later
article,2 in which he attempted to develop a general theory of social
cost, his policy orientation is quite clear:
It is my belief that economists, and policy makers generally, have
tended to overestimate
the advantages which come from govern3
ment regulation.
The policy orientation of Demsetz, perhaps Coase's most fervent
disciple, is equally clear: the role of central planning should be
minimized. Toward this end, he labors to show that the absence of an
observable market in certain services does not mean that these
services are extra-market, 4 and that imperfect market institutions
should not be compared with the mirage of idealized government
institutions, 5 taking time out to lavish his contempt upon such
6
heretics as Galbraith.
On the other side of the fence, it seems that many of those who
have worked so hard to prick the Coasian balloon have invested that
effort mainly because they found the policy implications of the Coase
Theorem rather offensive. Vhile Mishan's journal articles7 have
hinted at his ideological orientation, his book,8 written for more
popular consumption, exhibits no such coyness. He blames free
enterprise run wild for a goodly share of society's contemporary
problems. Samuels, viewing the economy as a system of coercive
power relationships, sees the Coase Theorem as an attempt to
maintain the prerogatives of the powerful, "to make it (welfare
economics) safe for capitalism." 9
*Assistant Professor, Agricultural Economics, New Mexico State University.
1. Coase, The FederalCommunications Commission, 2 J.Law & Econ. 1 (1959).
2. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960).
3. Id., at 22. See also Id., at 27.
4. Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of PropertyRights, 7 J. Law & Econ. 11 (1964).
5. Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.Law & Econ. 1 (1969).
6. Demsetz, Economics of the New Industrial State: Discussion, 60 Am. Econ. Rev. 2:481
(May, 1970).
7. See, e.g., Mishan, The Post-War Literature on Externality: An Interpretive Essay, 9 J. Econ.
Lit. 1 (1971).
8. E. Mishan, The Costs of Economic Growth (1967).
9. W. Samuels, Welfare Economics, Power and Property, in Perspectives of Property 146
(Inst. for Research on Land and Water Resources, Pennsylvania State University, G. Wunderlich
& W. Gibson ed., 1972).
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At almost every stage in the debate which sprang up around "The
Problem of Social Cost," it is unclear whether theory fathered policy
viewpoints, or vice-versa. That surely accounts for the fascination
which the Coasian debate has held for a sizeable number of academic
economists. It has the stuff of which great scholarly debates are
made-opportunity for high powered theorizing possibly leading to,
or justifying, radical suggestions for policy re-orientation.
In Parts I, II and III of this article, I attempt to examine the
development of Coasian externality theory, at each point paying some
attention to the policy generalizations which seem to arise from the
theoretical results. It is concluded that the assignment of liability is
not neutral in its impact on resource allocation. Armed with that
insight, the operation of market solutions to the problem of industrial
pollution is considered, in Part IV. The relevance of Coasian theory to
policy for externality situations is evaluated in Part V, and, somewhat
presumptuously, some advice is offered to Coasians on the direction of
their future efforts.
I THE COASE THEOREM
Since Coase presented his theory of social cost as an antidote to
"the Pigovian Tradition," it seems worthwhile to briefly review that
tradition. Ever since Marshall firmly established modem microeconomics, proofs of the efficiency of perfect competition have
required the assumption that externalities are absent. Pigou 1° made
the first notable attempt to resolve the externality problem. The
national dividend is maximized, he said, when private and social
marginal net products are equal in all uses. Where this equality is
violated, inefficiency exists.
Pigou visualized the problem as one of providing incentives to
guide firms producing externalities to the ideal output which maximizes national dividend. He proposed modifications to prices, taxes if
output is too high, and subsidies if output is too low. While
calculation of optimum taxes and subsidies was to be centralized (i.e.,
performed by governments), decisions on output were to be decentralized (i.e., made by individual producers).
The Pigovian approach maintained a substantial degree of decentralization of decisions, when compared with systems of standards or
legal changes which would criminalize creation of certain externalities. Nevertheless, the degree of central decision making suggested by
the Pigovian scheme was too much for Coase.
In his classic, 1 Coase set out to purge the literature on externalities
10. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (4th ed. 1932).
11. Coase, supra note 2.
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of what he saw as its two major faults: a tendency to view external
diseconomies, particularly, as a moral issue, and the resultant
Pigovian urge to solve the problem by having duly constituted
authority (the government) punish the offender. Pigou sought a means
of returning the aberrant system to efficiency. Yet, to Coase his
method of solution, focusing upon taxation of the producer of the
diseconomy, seemed to reek of moral absolutism.
The Coasian argument went something like this. First, the stage
was set by an assertion of the reciprocal nature of externalities,
presumably for the purpose of amoralizing the question, particulary,
2
of external diseconomies. Second, the concept of transferable'
liability rules was introduced. If property rights with respect to
liability for damages are clearly specified, transferable and rigidly
enforced upon appeal, under any given liability rule, l3 one or the
other party will have an incentive to attempt to modify the
externality by offering inducement to the other party to behave
differently. Negotiations for exchange of property rights in the
externality will continue until all gains from trade have been
exhausted. Given perfect competition, an efficient solution will be
achieved. Coase argued that, since marginal cost is unaffected, all
gains from trade will be exhausted at the same Pareto-efficient
outcome, regardless of which liability rule is in operation. In other
words, the market solution to a particular externality problem is
allocatively neutral with respect to the assignment of liability.
It is understandable that Coase's approach to externalities would be
attractive to academic economists of laissez-faire persuasion. It would
seem that (a) externalities could no longer be considered an impediment to efficiency, and (b) a completely decentralized approach to
solution of externality problems had been proposed. In spite of his
efforts to promote a relatively decentralized decision framework for
externality problems, Pigou was now cast as an enemy of laissez-faire.
Coase and his supporters had proposed the perfectly decentralized
solution. The price as well as the quantity of externality would be
established entirely by market forces. The role of the government
would be reduced to allocative impotence (as it should be, they might
12. Transferable liability rules are enforced by government only on appeal by one of the
involved parties, thus providing the possibility of exchange between the parties.
13. Two extreme examples of transferable liability laws are the zero liability law, Lz, and
the full liability law, L f . An infinite number of intermediate laws could be conceived. Lz
specifies that external diseconomies in any amount may be created with impunity; under such a
rule, the affected party would have an incentive to offer a bribe to induce the acting party to
reduce his output of external diseconomy. L f specifies that absolutely no externality may be
created without the consent of the affected party; under such a rule, the acting party would
have an incentive to offer compensation to induce the affected party to accept a positive
amount of externality.
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say). Government could establish a system of liability rules, but
resource allocation would be unaffected by the specific choice, since
any rule will result in the same equilibrium solution, and that solution
would be efficient. The market solution method, removing the
allocative significance of specific government decisions about externality problems, minimizes both the need of government for information and the likelihood of bureaucratic mistakes.
Individuals who support the status quo would be sorely tempted to
use the doctrine of allocative neutrality to justify continuation of the
general use of zero liability (Lz) for environmental externalities. After
all, if liability rules have no allocative impact, what use would it be to
change to full liability (Lf)?
I have attempted to lay out the bare bones of the Coasian argument
in such a manner that its appeal to laissez-faire economists would be
immediately obvious. Actually, the argument is of necessity more
complex. Now, I will briefly consider these complications, which are
conceded without argument by all Coasians.
(a) Income distribution is clearly influenced by the assignment
of liability for damages.
(b) Exchange involves costs which may often be substantial.
Each involved party must gather information and decide what his
bargaining position is to be. The bargaining process itself takes
time and money. The decisions made must be enforced. Costs of
negotiation and enforcing exchange decisions are commonly
called transactions costs. Coase was keenly aware of the existence
of transactions costs.' 4 He understood that transactions costs may
impede exchange which, in the absence of transactions costs,
would lead to greater efficiency.
(c) It is necessary to specify the range over which market
solutions could be expected to modify externalities. Buchanan and
Stubblebine 15 define a Pareto-relevant externality as one which is
characterized by the existence of potential gains from trade
between acting and affected parties. Exchange will take place
until potential gains from trade have been exhausted. From such a
definition, it follows tautologically that Pareto-relevant externalities are amenable to market solution. All other externalities are
presumably Pareto-irrelevant: inframarginal externalities, externalities which offend no one and externalities which offend one
party, who for reasons of utility function or budget constraint, is
unable to make an offer large enough to induce trade.
II COASIANS AND HYPER-COASIANS
Coase in "The Problem of Social Cost" offered his readers (1) an
14. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937).
15. Buchanan & Stubblebine, Externality, 29 Economica 371 (1962).
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attack on Pigou for proposing unnecessary and inefficient central
control of allocation, (2) a proposal for market solution of externality
problems,.based on a system of transferable property rights specifying
liability for damage, (3) a view of rights as factors of production, and
vice-versa, and (4) the suggestion that economic analysis of institutional choice proceed by comparison of net social benefits under
feasible alternative institutional structures. The four points are closely
related, and together they make an impressive contribution to the
literature. Points (3) and (4) are insights, now widely accepted, which
have already had major influence on research in pure and applied
welfare economics. Here, I concentrate upon (1) and (2), because they
are issues of vigorous debate with crucial policy implications.
The Coasian argument was quickly embraced by many academic
economists and lawyers. Summarized here are a few of the many
contributions which affirmed the Coasian argument and, in some
cases, extended it beyond the limits of Coase's seminal article. As
mentioned above, Buchanan and Stubblebine 16 proposed a terminology which made Pareto-relevant externalities amenable to market
solution. The Pareto-relevant tautology serves the ideological function
of making all other kinds of externalities seem less relevant or
irrelevant. As a further contribution toward a Pigovian debacle, in the
same paper they offered a proof that efficient tax-subsidy solutions to
externality problems require that the amount of money collected from
one party be paid to the other, which is not quite what Pigou had in
mind. It is, however, a kind of market solution with the government as
an intermediary.
While Coase had worked in a production framework, Davis and
Whinston explicitly extended the doctrine of allocative neutrality of
liability laws to the consumption case: "The law, which determines
17
the status quo point, affects only the final distribution of income."
8
Demsetz,1 in an imaginative use of the transactions costs argument, suggested that the absence of an observable market in any
commodity, discommodity or bundle of rights does not indicate
market failure. Rather, exchange is not observed because the transactions costs of arranging and enforcing exchange exceed the gains from
trade. The absence of an observable market is, in itself, an efficient
market solution. This type of argument, in the hands of partisan
proponents of laissez-faire, can be made to imply that the appearance
of what has traditionally been called market failure is really an
16. Id.
17. Davis & Whinston, Some Notes on EquatingPrivate and Social Cost, 32 Southern Econ. J.
113, 123 (1965).
18. Demsetz, supra note 4.

NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 14

optimal market solution. Thus, market failure is a wholly inadequate
excuse for legislative or administrative intervention in an externality
situation.
The euphoria of the Coasians is best summarized by the following
quotations:
.. . all externalities can be internalized, and all misallocations
(even those created by legal structures) can be remedied by the
market, except to the extent that transactions cost money, and the
structure itself creates some impediments to bargaining.19
and
.. . under
perfect competition, private and social costs will be
20
equal.
Cheung 2' proposed elimination of the use of the many specific
names which had developed to characterize various externality
situations. He went so far as to propose the abolition of the term
externality, itself.
. . . the mushrooming of alleged "externality" is attributable to
either (1)the absence of the right to contract, (2) the presence of a
contract, but with incomplete stipulations, or (3) the presence of
stipulations22 which are somehow inconsistent with marginal
equalities.
In other words, the problems which others have called externalities
are amenable to automatic solution by the market, provided a
complete and non-attenuated 23 structure of rights is established.
The tenor of these and many other contributions is to promote
policies which would preserve and extend the allocative role of the
market. It will be shown below that some of the above arguments are
incorrect, while others are tenable only if the allocative neutrality of
liability rules is granted.
III THE COUNTER ATTACK
It is noticeable that, while some academics were deeply impressed
by the Coasian market solution approach to policy for externalities,
politicians, administrators and the general public have largely ignored
this approach. A number of applied economists, led by Allen Kneese,
19. Calabresi, Transactions Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules. 11 J. Law &
Econ. 66, 68 (1968).
20. G. Stigler, The Theory of Price, 113 (3d. ed., 1966).
21. Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J.
Law & Econ. 49 (1970).
22. Id., at 51.
23. The term is used by Furubotn & Pejovich, Property Rights and Economic Theory: A
Survey of Recent Literature, 10 J. Econ. Lit. 1137 (1972).
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have always resisted the lure of a simplistic "just leave it to the
market" answer. Why, then, have the practitioners of economics and
public policy remained unimpressed by the Coasian argument? Is it
just an information gap which will close with time? Rather, I submit
that Coasian externality theory has several significant problems which
limit the applicability of market solutions. The remainder of this
article is devoted to exploration of these problems and a re-evaluation
of the role of market solutions.
Right from the start, it seems, there were some theoretical and
applied economists who had vague feelings that something was
wrong. This intellectual unease centered around the doctrine of allocative neutrality of liability rules and the amoralization of externality policy which that doctrine seemed to license. The argument that
since liability rules are allocatively neutral it does not matter which
particular rule is used was attacked on two fronts: (1) it was claimed
that, on distributional, moral and ethical grounds, it did matter which
rule was chosen, while (2) allocative neutrality, as a theoretical
conclusion, was itself challenged. Let us first consider the ethical
arguments.
A. Distributional,Moral and Ethical Consideration
The choice of liability rule affects the distribution of income
between acting and affected parties or, in the case of environmental
pollution, between emitters and receptors. The economist who
considers distributional effects irrelevant would not be concerned by
this. However, people, who, in spite of Coase's strictures, consider
pollution a moral issue perhaps similar to negligent or even criminal
property damage, are offended by the moral position associated with
Lz. Even if Lz and Lf were to result in equal amounts of pollution,
there is something offensive to some people about the suggestion that
the victim buy off the polluter. Are there no moral precepts to guide
the resolution of conflicts where two parties have opposing interests?
People, who, as a general philosophy, believe that income distribution should be more nearly equal, focus upon the likely relative
income and wealth of acting and affected parties in externality
situations. In the case of industrial pollution affecting citizens in the
neighborhood, it seems likely that emitters (industrialists and their
stockholders) may be more wealthy than the ordinary citizens who are
the receptors. If so, people who prefer a more equal distribution of
income would prefer Lf in externality situations where the acting
party is clearly the wealthier.
If political rhetoric reflects anything about the beliefs of ordinary
citizens, morality and equity are important issues to them. I believe
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the relative lack of success of the Coasian literature, viewed as a
polemic, among the general public and its elected representatives is
largely attributable to the fact that its ethical and distributional
implications can be interpreted to run counter to widely accepted
moral precepts. But, value neutral economic theorists have not been
much impressed by equity arguments. To impress one's fellow
economists, one needs to marshall arguments stronger than equity per
se.
B. Allocative Neutrality?
Kamien et al.24 and Tybout2 5 have attacked the doctrine of
allocative neutrality on the grounds that relaxation of some of Coase's
production economics assumptions allows development of more realistic models yielding different results. Kamien et al. demonstrate that,
in a dynamic case with changing cost functions and imperfect
information, market solutions through a government intermediary are
not allocatively neutral with respect to liability rules; there is
asymmetry between bribes and charges.
While Coase and the Coasians had implicitly assumed that, for
example, pollution and commodity output are joint products, Tybout
assumes they are substitute products. This latter assumption rather
realistically allows the possibility that by varying the input mix the
output mix of pollution and commodity can be varied. Under this
assumption, bribes and charges have asymmetrical results. Not only
that, but under certain assumptions, moving from the status quo by
bribery is impossible.
Dolbear, 26 Mishan 27 and Randall, 28 focusing attention on the
effects of the transfer of income between the involved parties and on
transactions costs, have made varying degrees of progress in circumscribing the generality of the allocative neutrality doctrine.
Income transfer effects: In the case of externality in consumption, a
change in liability rules changes the budget constraints of both acting
and affected parties, resulting in an income transfer effect, which can
be demonstrated by Slutsky equation analysis. 29 In all cases, except
for the very special case where the income elasticities of demand for
abatement of, say, an external diseconomy and for the commodity
associated with the diseconomy are zero, the income transfer effect is
24. Kamien et al., Asymmetry between Bribes and Charges,2 Water Resources Research 147
(1966).
25. Tybout, PricingPollution and Other Negative Externalities, 3 Bell J. Econ. Mgt. Sci. 252
(1972).
26. Dolbear, On the Theory of Optimum Externality, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 90 (1967).
27. Mishan, supra note 7.
28. A. Randall, On the Theory of Market Solutions to Externality Problems, Oregon
Agricultural Experiment Station Special Report No. 351 (1972).
29. Id., at 14-20.
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sufficient to induce shifts in the supply and demand curves for
abatement of the diseconomy. When these income elasticities are
positive, as we would expect them to be, the Lf rule results in a
greater level of abatement of an external diseconomy than does the
Lz rule. More generally, where any consumers are involved in an
externality situation, the demand or supply curves associated with
these consumers will shift with a change in liability rules, resulting in
30
different equilibrium levels of abatement.
Whenever capital is scarce, a change in liability rules will result in
a change in resource allocation and output of externality, even where
all involved parties are producers. The analysis is similar to that for
externality in consumption: a change in liability rules changes the
capital constraints affecting both parties. Again, a L f rule will result
in a greater level of abatement than a Lz rule.
Transactions costs: Where transactions costs are greater than zero,
the disparity between equilibrium solutions under Lz and L f is
increased. Under any liability rule, the party less favored by the rule
makes an offer. However, the existence of positive transactions costs
reduces the effective value of any offer. When the affected party must
pay, the existence of positive transactions costs shifts the demand
curve for abatement downward (and to the left). When the acting
party pays, the existence of positive transactions costs shifts the
supply curve for abatement downward (and to the right). As a change
in liability rules from Lz to Lf results in the former payer becoming
the receiver of payment and vice versa, the assignment of liability
affects the equilibrium output of externality, when transactions costs
are positive.
The disparity between the equilibrium solutions under different
liability rules increases as unit transactions costs increase. It is
conceivable, that transactions costs may be so great that movements
away from the starting point defined by the liability law may be
impossible. In such cases, a Lz law results in zero abatement while a
L f law results in complete abatement of an external diseconomy. An
educated guess would suggest that transactions costs of this magnitude
may not be unusual in practice.
To this point, we have implicitly assumed that transactions costs to
bring about exchange in a particular externality situation are the
same under Lz and L. However, good arguments can be made that
this is not so. Buchanan and Tullock, 3 Crocker 32 and Olson 33 have
argued that transactions costs are likely to be larger when an offer of
30. This finding is at variance with Davis & Whinston, supra note 17.
31. J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (1962).
32. Crocker, Externalities,Property Rights and TransactionsCosts: An EmpiricalStudy, 14
Law & Econ. 451 (1971).
33. M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1965).
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payment must be made by a large and diffuse group of individuals,
rather than by a much smaller group of individuals who are more
vitally interested in this particular issue. This hypothesis is relevant to
cases of environmental pollution from industrial sources, where the
affected party is usually a diffuse group of citizens and the acting
party is a much smaller group of entrepreneurs whose incomes are
directly related to pollution levels. It follows, then, that in cases of
industrial pollution a Lz rule is more likely to result in transactions
costs too high for the achievement of a solution other than the status
quo than is a Lf rule. Significantly, the only detailed empirical study
of market solutions to external diseconomies currently available, that
by Crocker, 34 is entirely consistent with this theoretical work.
The current situation in the theory of market solutions to externality problems can be briefly summarized. A Pareto-relevant externality, being characterized by potential gains from trade, will generate
incentives for one or the other of the involved parties to initiate
negotiations aimed at modifying that externality. A solution different
from the status quo situation may be achieved, and if perfect
competition prevails in all relevant industries including the transactions industry, that solution may be Pareto-efficient.
While the possibility of efficient solutions under different liability
rules is granted, what about allocative neutrality? Liability rules are
neutral with respect to resource allocation if: (a) all consumers
involved in the externality situation have income elasticities of
demand for modification of the externality and for the commodity
associated with the externality equal to zero, (b) the use of capital is a
free good; (c) transactions costs are zero; (d) the externality and the
commodity associated with it are joint products, rather than substitute products; (e) information is perfect in both static and dynamic
contexts; and (f) perfect competition exists in all the industries
involved.
Frankly, an economist would be hard put to find any situation
where the assignment of liability has an absolutely neutral effect on
resource allocation. The differences between equilibrium market
solutions under Lz and L f may be quite small in some relatively
unimportant externality situations involving a very small number of
parties. As the complexity of the situation increases and the number
of involved parties expands, deviations from allocative neutrality can
be expected to become greater. For the kind of large-scale externality
situations which become social problems, different liability rules will
result in quite different solutions. For example, in cases of industrial
34. Crocker, supra note 32.
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pollution a Lz rule is more likely than any positive liability rule to
result in zero or low levels of abatement. This accords with our
observations. When laws with respect to pollution are seldom and
ineffectively enforced, market solutions leading to reductions in
emissions are seldom observed.
In comparison with a Lz rule, a Lf rule will result in (1) a higher
degree of abatement of an external diseconomy such as pollution; 35 (2)
a reallocation of resources toward pollution control and production of
commodities which can be produced by low pollution processes; (3)
production of fewer, higher priced commodities; and (4) an initial
redistribution of income in favor of the affected party.
This may be an appropriate place to re-evaluate the claims of some
of Coase's supporters, as presented in Part II. A few can be disposed
of expeditiously. It is not tenable, despite the contention of Davis and
Whinston,3 6 to extend the claim of allocative neutrality to externality
in consumption. Except for a very special case, changes in liability
rules produce income transfer effects which lead to allocative
differences. The generalizations of Calabresi 3 7 and Stigler 38 were
somewhat extravagant. Even if the whole Coasian argument were
granted, it applies only to Pareto-relevant externalities, not all
externalities or even all important externalities.
The argument of Demsetz 39 is more complex. It is true that the
absence of an observable market may itself be an efficient market
solution. The problem is that efficiency has been robbed of much of its
meaning. A different liability rule, a different distribution of rights,
will lead to a different solution, but given perfect competition, both
the old and the new solutions will be efficient. Under different
liability rules, the production functions for transactions may be
different. Not all "efficient" solutions will maximize net social
product. We are forced to select from among different efficient
solutions. The more aggressively laissez-faire version of Demsetz'
argument, that the subliminal (unobserved) market is the best
solution, is insupportable. A change in liability rule may cause a
market in rights to spring to life, observable to all. Further, the
possibility that some type of non-market solution may involve
transactions costs lower than market solutions under any liability law
35. Some exceptions to this generalization can be envisaged. Ralph d'Arge suggests the case
of a fugitive polluter, who would hide in an Lf situation but would come forward to identify
himself and receive a bribe under Lz. Under L f , the phantom polluter would pollute more
heavily (that is, until apprehended) than under LZ.
36. Davis & Whinston, supra note 17.
37. Calabresi, supra note 19.
38. Stigler, supra note 20.
39. Demsetz, supra note 4.
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must be considered. Then, social net product may be maximized by
some non-market approach.
Cheung's 40 suggestion that a "so-called externality" can always be
eliminated by a complete specification of rights in contractual
arrangements can also be seen to beg the important questions raised
in the previous paragraph. If different assignments of rights will lead
to different contractual arrangements involving different transactions
production functions and resulting in different resource allocations,
then some assignments of rights must be "better" than others, and a
"best" assignment may exist. Cheung offers little help in making the
choice.
The implicit suggestion of the Coasians that the doctrine of
allocative neutrality of liability rules provides a mechanism (market
solution) which eliminates the allocative role of the government fall
flat with the demise of allocative neutrality. Rather, complete and
careful analysis of the allocative impact of liability rules indicates
that, even if market solutions are used, the choice of a liability rule
involves the government in manipulating resource allocation and,
ultimately, the whole range of macroeconomic variables.
A section entitled "The Counter Attack" can hardly dare close
without some mention of what the Pigovians are doing. Kneese and
Bower 4 ' had proposed and resolutely defended a Pigovian system of
taxes on water pollutants at a time when the Coasians had forced the
Pigovians into an eclipse at the academic level. Now, the beginnings
of a neo-Pigovian resurgence in externality theory can be seen.
Whitcomb 4 2 and Baumo1 43 have offered various proofs that Pigovian
taxes will work as Pigou had intended. It is not my purpose here to
evaluate this very recent literature, but I would be remiss if I failed to
draw to the reader's attention both the emergence of this trend in the
literature and the possibilities it presents. The legitimizations of
Pigovian taxes at the theoretical level could provide a stimulus to a
movement which already has many backers among the practitioners.
Presumably, Coasians would prefer Pigovian taxes to rigid standards,
if that were the choice.
IV MAKING MARKET SOLUTIONS WORK
In this section the operation of market solutions to externality
problems is considered. It is concluded that, given the demolition of
the doctrine of allocative neutrality, the policy implications of the
40. Cheung, supra note 21.
41. A. Kneese and B. Bower, Managing Water Quality: Economics, Technology and
Institutions (1962).
42. D. Whitcomb, Externalities and Welfare (1972).
43. W. Baumol, On Taxation and Control of Externalties,62 Am. Econ. Rev. 307 (1972).
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study of property rights are quite different from those suggested by
the Coasians and hyper-Coasians.
My remarks will be focused around an example which I have
already used briefly in several places in this article: pollution in
populated areas resulting from industrial sources. When laws with
respect to pollution are lenient and/or seldom and ineffectively
enforced, the liability situation can be said to approach Lz. Market
solutions to this type of externality problem are seldom, if ever,
observed. The material presented in Section III provides ample
reason to predict such a result. Industrial pollution problems arise
from disposal of wastes into common property resources. One, or a
relatively small number of acting parties, dumps wastes into a
common property resource (e.g., air or water), reducing the welfare of
many affected parties. 44 Clearly, a Lz rule would minimize the
likelihood of pollution abatement in such cases. Given that organization of an affected party consisting of many users of a common
property resource may involve prohibitive transactions costs, the
equilibrium under Lz may well remain at the status quo. The
"solution" may be to continue emissions at the maximum level (that
level which maximizes the firm's profits when environmental services
for waste disposal are priced at zero).
Nevertheless, market solutions cannot be so easily dismissed. The
demolition of the doctrine of allocative neutrality suggests a way out.
We know that the conversion of liability rules from Lz to L f can be
expected to increase the level of pollution abatement achieved. Let us
consider the operation of market solutions to industrial pollution
problems under a full liability law.
There are three major steps in the process of negotiating and
enforcing market solutions. First, recognition of the new status quo
established by the L f rule must be enforced. Firms polluting without
having obtained the permission of the affected parties must be made
to either cease or obtain that permission. Second, the acting party
now has an incentive to initiate negotiations to induce the affected
parties to accept a certain amount of emissions in exchange for
compensation. Acting and affected parties must organize themselves
to gather information, decide on their bargaining positions, and carry
out negotiations aimed at achieving agreement on acceptable levels
of pollution and compensation. Third, the agreement achieved must
be policed and enforced. Compensation payments must be made as
44. Since LZ requires the affected parties to pay, the common property nature of the
resources polluted gives rise to the freeloader problem. In the absence of compulsion (anathema,
one preseumes, to Coasians), many affected citizens would rationally refuse to invest anything in
the improvement of a common property resource.
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agreed, and the agreed emissions limit must not be exceeded. The
judicial and enforcement functions of society must stand ready to
uphold the agreement.
There are a number of alternative ways in which these steps may
be carried out. It seems reasonable that different organizational
methods for achieving exchange may involve different production
functions for transactions. Under some organizational systems, movement from the status quo may be impossible; under others, exchange
may take place. The next few pages will be devoted to some
speculation about how the organization of the involved parties may
affect the operation of market solutions under L f .
We must start by assuming that the legal system stands ready to
enforce the L f rule and to enforce strictly any agreements made
between acting and affected parties. Such an assumption is hardly
radical; without enforcement of the law of business agreements, our
way of life would collapse.
The first and third steps in negotiating and enforcing market
solutions involve approaches to the judicial and policing systems
established by government. For the moment, let us concentrate on the
second step, the negotiation of exchange, assuming simply that the
first and third steps have been taken care of. We will return to the first
and third steps later. For negotiations, consider three basic methods of
organization of the affected parties: individual action, collective
action and action facilitated by a public agency. Organization of the
acting parties is a simple matter. Their intense economic interest in
the outcome will be sufficient to ensure their participation in decision
making. And, since we are dealing with industrial pollution, their
small numbers will greatly facilitate their organization, if cooperative action is necessary. 45 So, here we concentrate on the
affected parties.
a) Individual action by affected parties.
If all members of the affected party were in unanimous
agreement about all facets of the exchange and enforcement of
rights, there would be no problem. Agreement within the affected
party would be reached speedily and inexpensively. However,
such fortuitous unanimity would hardly be expected. The affected
party is made up of many citizens with varying tastes, preferences
and wealth. Because the resource into which the waste products
are dumped is a common property resource, it is essential that an
agreement be reached as to the unique amount of pollution
45. Buchanan & Tullock, supra note 31; Crocker, supra note 32; and Olson, supra note 33.
This type of argument would be invalid for externality situations where the acting party is made
up of very many members with diverse interests, e.g., pollution from automobiles.
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allowed to exist in any one place at any one time. The result of
individual bargains would probably be a series of individual
agreements calling for different amounts of abatement, hardly a
viable solution. So, extensive contracting and recontracting might
be required to arrive at agreements with all parties allowing the
same amount of emission.
If the law allowed any one affected individual to demand
adherence to the L f law, acting parties would be obliged to
conclude individual agreements with all affected parties. The
"holdout problem" familiar to urbanologists may assume significant proportions. One or more affected citizens may steadfastly
refuse to conclude bargains, hoping to obtain exorbitant compensation (i.e., to obtain a large proportion of the total economic
surplus for themselves).
Everything considered, the prospect is for extremely high
transactions costs and possible failure to obtain any solution other
than the starting point defined by the Lf law. The problem then
would be not one of too little abatement but rather of too much.
Complete abatement of pollution may disrupt the production of
commodities, employment, wages and prices to an extent intolerable to citizens of an affluent society.
b) Action by the affected party voluntarily organized.
Since we are dealing with management of common property
resources, collective decision making seems a reasonable approach. A single agreement could be concluded between the
acting party and the affected parties operating as a group. If
action of the affected parties as a group required unanimous
approval of all affected persons, exchange may be very difficult to
arrange. Buchanan and Tullock 46 and Olson 47 caution us that
procedures requiring unanimity may result in high transactions
costs. Transactions costs in achieving unanimity probably increase
quite rapidly as the number of people involved in the decision
increases. If a requirement of unanimity resulted in transactions
costs too high to allow movement from the status quo, the result
would again be complete pollution abatement, which may result
in extreme economic and social disruption.
Alternatively, it would be possible to set up collective organizations which could take action with less than unanimous agreement
of all affected persons. This alternative would seem to involve
lower transactions costs than the other procedures which rely on
direct bargaining among the involved parties.
c) Public agencies to bargain for the affected parties.
A public agency could be set up to represent the affected
46. Buchanan & Tullock, supra note 31.
47. Olson, supra note 33.
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parties. If the agency would have the power to make decisions
binding on the affected parties, transactions costs would be
relatively low. A well-designed public agency would operate on a
local level, handling units of problem-shed size (e.g., an airshed or
a watershed). The citizens of the problem-shed would be represented in the agency's decision making councils. Compensation
received would be distributed among affected persons, after the
agency's operating expenses are subtracted. Transactions costs
would be kept relatively low, which would allow the achievement
of exchange in many cases. Such a system is clearly a variant of
the market solution approach.
This procedure is similar to the system of emission charges
advocated by Kneese. A system of charges operated on a
pollution-shed basis, allowing local public agencies to bargain
with polluters to determine the local unit compensation price (i.e.,
unit charge) and to distribute the income from charges among the
affected citizens, would closely approximate a market solution.
Increasing bureaucratization would tend to increase the disparity
between market solutions and charge systems. For example, the
similarity of market solutions and charge systems becomes more
tenuous as we move from problem-shed charges to state or
nationwide charges, or from distribution of charge income among
affected parties to spending it on their behalf (e.g., in environmental projects), or simply using it as government income to meet
general government expenses.
It seems that the two types of decision making procedures which
are most likely to work effectively are the use of a public agency or
the use of collectives of affected persons operating with less than
unanimous consent. These can be expected to be most effective,
because they will tend to keep transactions costs as low as possible
and maximize the occurrence of exchange in externality situations.
For a given liability rule, net social product is maximized when the
frequency of voluntary exchange is maximized, which requires that
48
transactions costs per unit of exchange be minimized.
These two types of procedures differ from each other and from
Kneese's system of Pigovian taxes only in degree. In this section, we
have attacked a major social problem (industrial pollution) from a
Coasian standpoint, seeking a market solution. Yet, the practicalities
of getting the job done forced us to move very close to a Pigovian
solution. In practice, the Coasian and Pigovian solutions converged at
a point very near the position held by Kneese.
Nevertheless, within the set of solutions facilitated by collective or
48. Reduction of both the fixed and the variable costs of transacting is desirable. Reduction
of average total costs (which may be achieved through reduction of fixed and/or variable costs)
allows more frequent movement away from the status quo determined by the operative liability
rule. Reduction of variable costs allows the exchange of more units.
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public decision making, important choices can be made as to the
optimal level of bureaucratization. Where pollution-sheds can be
easily defined on the basis of physical criteria and where there are
relatively few sources of pollution, I suspect that market solutions
negotiated by local committees may be appropriate. In cases of
industrial pollution in urban areas where there are many sources of
pollution, each affecting different but overlapping geographical areas,
reliance on local committees may require a huge number of
committees to be set up, each dealing with a single polluter. The
difficulties inherent in that approach would be substantial. Alternatively, one committee could bargain with all polluters. If this
alternative were chosen, the amount of expertise required of committee members and the amount of their time used would tend to grow so
large that the committee would take on the characteristics of a public
agency.
The desirability of distributing compensation or charge income
among the affected parties must be considered. As the size and
diversity of the group of affected parties grows, the transactions costs
of identifying damaged parties and the extent of the damage suffered
will increase. The alternatives to direct distribution are (1) expenditure of the charge income by the collective or agency on specific
projects to benefit the affected parties, and (2) transfer of the charge
income into the local, state or federal treasury. These latter alternatives represent reduced transactions costs but increasing bureaucratization.
Decisions must also be made about the desirable degree of
participation of the affected parties in the decision making of the
collective or agency which represents them. This can range from a
referendum on each issue to imposition of an agency directly
responsible to the federal government, and only indirectly responsible
to the affected citizens.
These decisions about the optimal level of bureaucratization are
important. They can vastly affect the efficiency and effectiveness of
the institutions which facilitate market solutions. Yet, it seems that
effective market solution of, say, pollution problems requires some
institutional arrangements in the interface between Coasian and
Pigovian methods. It seems to me that Coasians may be most effective
by working on questions such as the optimal degree of bureaucratization of institutions, rather than fighting Pigovians.
Our discussion of the second step in achieving market solution to
industrial pollution problems greatly facilitates discussion of the first
and third steps. These steps involve appeal to the judicial and
policing system set up by the state which will enforce recognition of
the L f rule and the particular market solution agreed upon. Assuming
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effective enforcement, the important question is, who shall have the
right to appeal to the courts to demand such enforcement? Operation
of the preferred procedures of negotiating, collectives or public
agencies working with less than unanimous consent, would be
negated, if any affected citizen was recognized by the courts and
could effectively demand adherence to the status quo specified by L f .
This problem could be circumvented, if only the collective or the
public agency was recognized by the courts. However, in this case,
some citizens may feel that the collective or agency is not acting with
enough vigor on behalf of the affected parties. To avoid this, the
collective or agency could be made subject to the approval of the
affected parties, possibly expressed in referenda. Procedures for
referenda would need to be set. Should referenda be automatically
held on each issue, presumably at substantial expense; or should
referenda be held either at regular intervals for re-election of
committee members or on specific issues after petitions bearing the
names of a certain percentage of members of the affected party have
been presented? Either way some members of the affected party may
feel that their positions had been inadequately represented. In such
cases, it may be desirable to allow disgruntled members of the
affected party to have individual access to the courts, not to sue the
acting party directly, but to complain that the collective or agency
has not acted appropriately. 49 This latter alternative may serve to
both protect the integrity of the principle of collective action and
allow unsatisfied affected parties to challenge the actions of the
collective. Here again, intellectual activity is sorely needed to tackle
important questions of detail in the organization of non-regulatory
solutions to externality problems.
In summary, market solutions will solve many of our serious social
problems caused by externalities, only if liability laws are converted
to Lf or something approaching it, and collective or public agencies
are established to facilitate exchange and appeal to state authorities
for enforcement.
V COASIAN EXTERNALITY THEORY AS A GUIDE FOR POLICY
Coasian externality theory was introduced and commended by its
proponents to policy makers as providing a rationale and a method for
minimizing government intrusion in externality situations. As such,
does it stand up?
First, I must pay tribute to the tremendous contribution of Coase's
49. Ralph d'Arge draws my attention to one example of this kind of legal action, on a
national scale. Currently the cities of Riverside and San Bernadino are suing the Environmental
Protection Agency in order to force the agency to enforce its ambient air standards in the city of
Los Angeles. This approach was chosen in preference to directly suing the city of Los Angeles.
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"The Problem of Social Cost." It is a truly seminal article, which has
stimulated voluminous research and writing on externalities, liability
laws and the economic nature of property and rights. Most of Coase's
insights have proven to be correct. The view of rights as factors of
production has stimulated much useful research.
But as a practical matter, allocative neutrality of liability laws has
been demolished. Can the Coasian laissez-faire policy conclusion
survive the demolition of allocative neutrality?
First let us note that its survival of the morality issue was only
partial. The laissez-faire economists held firm, but many economists
and most everyone else bailed out. In a society founded by Puritans
and possessing to this day a strong sense of right and wrong, Coase's
amoralization of the externality issue faced an uphill battle for
acceptance. In essence, Coase seemed to be saying that in cases where
two parties have conflicting interests there are no moral precepts to
guide the resolution of the conflict. Visions of criminals being bribed
to desist and of little children being regarded as "hitting" automobiles
in pedestrian crossings, with Coasians failing to be morally offended,
were evoked, e.g., in Weld.5 0 Mishan 5 ' scored points with the issue of
income distribution. Surely decent people could see a moral problem
in poor citizens bribing an affluent producer of effluents, or accepting
pollution in defenseless silence, while Coasians looked on benignly.
But, to hard-headed economists the claim of the Coasians and
hyper-Coasians that Coase had proposed a perfectly decentralized
method of solving externality problems suffers its most severe loss of
credibility with the demolition of the doctrine of allocative neutrality.
Allocative neutrality was the clincher for the Coasian argument. Its
demise is disastrous to the laissez-faire people. Governments must
choose between alternative liability rules, not in an atmosphere of
allocative impotency, but rather in the knowledge that the allocative
effects of their choice will be substantial. They must choose between
a myriad of different solutions, each efficient given perfect competition. Control of liability implies manipulation of resource allocation
throughout the whole economy, and therefore, of macro-economic
variables like aggregate supply and demand, employment, interest
rates and inflation. The choice of liability involves the government in
real economic planning.
The policy significance of the Coasian study of property rights is
just the opposite of what some proponents of laissez-faire would have
us believe. The fact that different configurations of property rights
50. Paper by John Weld, The Social Cost of the Coase Theorem, presented at the
Symposium on Environmental Economics and the Law, University of California, Riverside, Feb.
24-5, 1972.
51. Mishan, supra 7; Pangloss on Pollution, 73 Swedish J. Econ. 113 (1971).
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have different impacts on both allocation and distribution illustrates
the need for understanding the impacts of specific configurations of
rights. Collective decision making procedures must select appropriate
configurations of rights, not only specifying rights in complete and
non-attenuated form, 52 but also selecting that particular bundle of
rights which will provide precisely the correct incentive structure to
achieve the collective goal.
The Coasian, assuming he is a laissez-faire economist who seeks to
minimize the role of government in the economy, is now faced with a
cruel dilemma. He can insist that market solutions under Lz, the zero
liability rule, are an adequate approach to externality problems. But,
he must know by now that liability rules are not allocatively neutral,
and L z can be expected to minimize abatement of, say, industrial
pollution. Can he support such a position without appearing to be
blatantly anti-environment? Even if he has no strong feelings one way
or the other about the environment, he cannot be at all sure that Lz
will result in maximization of net social product.
He can give his approval to the establishment of L f , but he insists
that market solutions be obtained without the help of any governmental or pseudo-governmental agency. The discussion in Section IV
makes it clear that such an approach to industrial pollution problems
may create a monster threatening the very capitalist system whose
salvation is the goal of Coasians; not only threatening it, but
threatening it more than any Pigovian system ever could. Under Lf ,
whenever transactions costs are sufficiently high to preclude exchange, the status quo preserved is one of zero pollution, complete
abatement. That could really put firms out of business and people out
of workl
His final and most reasonable alternative is to join the neoPigovians, and accept conversion to Lf and the creation of collective
or public agencies to facilitate exchange. Such a system preserves
many of the advantages of decentralized market decision making.
Working with the neo-Pigovians, the Coasians can put their influence
behind institutional designs which would minimize transactions costs,
restrain the growth of the agency to problem-shed size, and maximize
the opportunities for participation of affected citizens in agency
decision making. In so doing, they can contribute vitally to the
development of viable programs which would modify externalities
like pollution, while retaining many of the attributes of the market.

52. As Cheung, supra note 22, would have us believe.

